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By M. Byron Fisher 
716 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE SUPREIVIE COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
S. C. KELSEY and DA YID E. 
SORENSEN, t 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
Case No. 
vs. \/ 10568 
C. PHIL HANSEN and 
BOB BOYER, 
Defendants-llcupundnu'.\. ! 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant brought an action on a written contract 
against Respondent and one C. Phil Hansen, alleging 
that Respondent had, by the agreement, undertaken 
to assume certain obligations and in failing to pay 
them had damaged the Appellant. 
I 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
This case was tried before the Court. At the close 
of Appellant's case Respondent moved to dismiss as 
to Respondent. The Court took this motion under ad-
visement until Respondent had produced his evidence 
and rested. The matter was again taken under advise-
ment and thereafter the Court granted Respondent's 
motion and entered an order dismissing Appellant's 
Complaint. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant, as seller, on September 23, 1963, entered 
into an Earnest Money Agreement (Ex. 1-P) with 
Respondent and one C. Phil Hansen as buyers. The 
Agreement called for the exchange of certain real prop-
erties. As part of this Agreement, Respondent and 
Mr. Hansen agreed to assume the cost of certain extras 
relating to Appellant's property. 
This Earnest Money Agreement states, at line 27, 
that the instruments of conveyance would be made in 
names "to be arranged." Since the transaction was an 
exchange, this phrase applied to the documents of 
conveyance from both parties. Respondent testified he 
informed Appellant before the exchange deeds were 
executed and after the Earnest Money Agreement was 
signed that Mr. Hansen would be the sole purchaser 
of the property. (Tr. 44-45). 
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At the closing Appellant was presented a deed 
for his signature conveying his property only to Mr. 
Hansen. (Ex. P-2). On the same date, October 1, 1963, 
there was executed an Assignment of Contract (Ex. 
D-3) covering the Hansen property and signed by C. 
Phil Hansen alone and listing Appellant and his wife 
as assignees. Later, on January 14, 1964, a Quitclaim 
Deed conveying the Hansen property to Appellant 
and his wife was signed by Mr. Hansen and delivered 
to Appellant. (Ex. D-4). 
The final documents of transfer between Appellant 
and Mr. Hansen were not prepared by Respondent 
nor were they prepared with his knowledge (Tr. 40-
41) and Respondent did not communicate with Appel-
lant to ask him to come to close the transaction (Tr. 
41) nor was he present at said closing. (Tr. 41). In 
fact, from the time Appellant was informed of Mr. 
Hansen's sole interest in the exchange, the transaction 
was entirely handled by :Mr. Hansen (Tr. 44). From 
the date of the Earnest Money Agreement, neither 
Respondent's name nor signature appear on any docu-
ment relating to this transaction. 
'Vhen Mr. Hansen subsequently defaulted on the 
payments under this assumed obligation, Appellant 
called Respondent four or five times about the delin-
quency and was told each time by Respondent that he 
would refer the matter to Mr. Hansen (Tr. 41-2) 
which was done. (Tr. 42). 
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ARGUMENT 
The Respondt:nt, while initially agreeing, as a 
signer of the Earnest Money Agreement, to participate 1 
in the assumption of the obligations here at issue, was 
not a recipient of the property which formed the con-
sideration for such assumption. Such assumption and 
the supporting conveyance were integral parts of the 
single transaction, in which Respondent ultimately had 
neither interest nor responsibility. 
No. 1. THE DEBT-ASSUMPTION AGREE-
MENT WAS NOT A COLLATERAL AGREE-
MENT WHICH SURVIVED THE EXECU-
TION OF THE EXCHANGE DEEDS. 
No. 2. THE EARNEST l\'lONEY AGREE-
MENT WAS, BY ITS OWN TERMS, ABRO-
GATED BY THE EXECUTION OF THE EX- , 
CHANGE DEEDS. 
No. 3. IF THE DEBT - A S S UMP T I 0 N 
AGREEMENT DID SlTRVIVE THE EXECU-
TION OF THE EXCHANGE DEEDS, IT DID 1 
SO ONLY AS TO THE VENDEE OF APPEL-
LANT'S PROPERTY. 
No. 4. EVEN SHOULD THE DEBT-AS-
SUMPTION PROVISIONS OF THE EARN-
EST MONEY AGREEMENT BE APPLIC-
ABLE TO RESPONDENT, THERE "\VAS A 
TOTAL FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION AS 
4 
TO RESPONDENT, IN THAT APPELLANT 
DID NOT PERFORl\tI HIS OBLIGATIONS TO 
RESPONDENT. 
I 
THE. DEBT-ASSUMPTION AGREEMENT 
vV AS NOT A COLLATERAL AGREEMENT 
WHICH SURVIVED THE EXECUTION OF 
THE EXCHANGE DEEDS. 
The general rule of law in this area is clear and 
has been recognized in several Utah decisions, among 
them those cited by Appellants. Utah Savings & Trust 
Co. v. Stoutt, 36 Utah 206, 102 Pac. 865 (1909) ;Knight 
v. Southern Pacific Co.,52 Utah 42,172 Pac. 689 (1918) 
and Reese Howell Co. v. Brown, 48 Utah 142,158 Pac. 
684 ( 1916). The latter case, quoting the general law 
and recognizing the legitimate substitution of parties, 
states at page 689: 
"No rule of law is better settled than that, 
where a deed has been executed and accepted as 
performance of an executory contract to convey 
real estate, the contract is functus officio, and 
the rights of the parties rest thereafter solely 
on the deed. This is so although the deed thus 
accepted varies from that stipulated for in the 
contract, as where the vendee accepts the deed 
of a third party in lieu of the deed of his vendor; 
" 
See also Snider v. Marble, 168 Kan. 459, 213 P. 2d 984 
(1950). 
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Indeed, the variation or inconsistency noted by the 
Utah Court has been regarded as an important factor 
in the interpretation of a final agreement as a recision 
of the original agreement since it clearly indicates a 
change from the original. The effect of such incon-
sistent later agreement has been recognized in Hughes 
v. Helzer, 182 Ore. 205, 185 P. 2d 537 (1947), wherein 
the Court said: 
"The procuring of a new contract of sale cov-
ering tract C, the terms of which were incon-
sistent with and could not stand together with 
those of the original contract ... may in itself 
be regarded as a discharge or surrender of the 
original contract." (Emphasis added). 
See also 55 Am .J ur; Vendor and Purchaser, Sec. 583 
at page 977, wherein it states: 
"As a general rule a contract for the sale of 
land . . . will be considered as having been re-
scinded by a subsequent and inconsistent con-
tract between the same parties concerning the 
same subject matter, ... " (Emphasis added). 
Appellants' citation in the annotation at 84 ALR 
1041 reiterates this point and in speaking of agreements 
to pay encumbrances which did not merge in a subse-
quent deed, the annotation goes on to qualify its lan-
guage by stating a merger of a preliminary agreement 
does not exist when the subsequent deed 
" ... does not contain ... any stipulation in-
consistent therewith ... ,, (Emphasis added)· 
6 
In the instant case, the final agreement is incon-
sistent with the Earnest n-Ioney Agreement of Sep-
tember 23, 1963, in a basic element. The preliminary 
agreement contemplated two buyers; in the final trans-
action, there was but one. The clear implication being 
that the parties, subsequent to the initial agreement, 
decided only one of the buyers would continue with the 
transaction. The fact that the exchange deeds were 
executed by and to this single buyer with the knowl-
edge of all concerned is evidence of the conscious re-
lease of one buyer from both the benefit and the obli-
gations of the preliminary agreement. 
The three cases cited by Appellants in an attempt 
to preserve the Respondent's assumption of the obli-
gation beyond the final execution of the deeds are each 
distinguishable from the present case in at least one 
important factor. 
In each of the cases, Linbrook Realty Corp. v. 
Rogers, 158 Va. 181, 163 SE 346, 84 ALR 1035 
(1932); Stockton v. Gould, 149 Pa. 69, 24 A. 160 
( 1892) ; and Shockley v. Roelli, 188 Wis. 564, 206 NW 
856 ( 1926), the ultimate vendee was not a party to the 
preliminary agreement but was in fact a stranger both 
to that agreement and to the vendor himself. 
This is far from the situation in which, as here, the 
ultimate vendee was not only known to the vendor but 
was in fact a party to the original agreement and the 
final transaction was not a substitution of parties but 
simply the reduction from two buyers to one. 
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The burden of proof rests on one who denies the 
merger of a prior contract into a deed to show that a 
merger was not intended, Smith v. Vehrs, 194 Ore. 
492, 242 P. 2d 586 (1952). A merger was clearly 
intended and accomplished and Appellant failed at 
trial to meet the burden of his attack upon such merger. 
II 
THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT 
WAS, BY ITS OWN TERMS, ABROGATED 
BY THE EXECUTION OF TIIE EXCHANGE 
DEEDS. 
The Earnest Money Agreement, at lines 34 and 35, 
stated: 
"It is further agreed that the execution of the 
final contract shall abrogate this Earnest Money 
Receipt and Offer to Purchase." 
By its very terms, this Agreement ceased to exist upon 
execution of the exchange deeds and became thereafter 
a nullity. The parties agreed in language that is clear 
and unequivocal that once the final docuoments were 
executed, with no restriction placed on the terms there-
of, that the Earnest Money Agreement would there-
after be of no further force and effect. Those final 
documents have been executed and by the clear intent 
of the parties the Earnest Money Agreement with all 
the rights and obligations set forth therein has termi-
nated. 
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\ 
I 
) 
\Vhile it is true the final documents differed to 
some extent from the Earnest Money Agreement it 
cannot be seriously argued that a final agreement may 
not differ from a preliminary one for there can be no 
question of the right or ability of the parties to amend 
or modify any agreement. Such ability is identical with 
that which permits the formation of an agreement in 
the first instance. 
An Earnest .Money Agreement, by its very nature, 
is a preliminary, temporary agreement and, by its terms 
and useage, contemplates and anticipates its own re-
placement, with the attendant opportunity for altera-
tion or modification. The preliminary nature of this 
Earnest Money Agreement is further evidenced in the 
fact that its own terms contemplated at least one change, 
a possible substitution of parties. The agreement uses 
the phrase "to be arranged" in the blank for the 
grantee's name. Appellant testified that he too com-
pleted the exchange in his own and his wife's name after 
eliminating the joint interest of a third party in the 
Kelsey property (Tr. 34-35), a move not unlike that 
of Respondent and Mr. Hansen. 
Even apart from the contractual language cited 
above, it has been generally held that the performance 
of any modified agreement indicates the intent of the 
parties to accept the new and abandon the old. Nord-
f ors v. [(night, 90 Utah 114, 60 P. 2d lll5 (1936). In 
the case before the Court, the Appellant did perform 
under the modification as did Mr. Hansen, a clear 
indication of their intent to rely on that modification. 
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The Earnest Money Agreement of September 2a, 
1963, by its own terms and by the intent and subse-
quent actions of the parties, was and is of no further 
force and effect once the exchange deeds were executed 
and delivered. 
III 
IF THE DEBT-ASSUJHPTION AGREE-
~IENT DID SURVIVE THE EXECUTION OF 
THE EXCHANGE DEEDS, IT DID SO ONLY 
AS TO THE VENDEE OF APPELLANTS' 
PROPERTY. 
The two deeds and the assignment of contract 
executed as the final transaction in the subject exchange 
were entirely in harmony and consistent with the Ear-
nest Money Agreement in the matter of the obligations 
and benefits falling upon C. Phil Hansen and under 
these circumstances, if the obligations of that initial 
agreement survived at all they can only be charged 
to Mr. Hansen. No one would doubt his responsibility 
for those obligations. Appellant seeks to impose those 
obligations upon Respondent simply because there now 
appears some doubt as to the solvency of Mr. Hansen. 
Appellant was clearly willing to deal only with 
Mr. Hansen in the final exchange as evidenced by the 
fact that he knowlingly did so. Appellant's claim he 
did not notice to whom he was transferring his prop-
erty and did not read the deed proffered to him (Tr. 35) 
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is belied by the fact that by his own testimony he is 
a man of considerable experience in the real estate 
field who pays attention to the documents he signs 
(Tr. 35). To this must be added Respondent's testi-
mony that he affirmatively notified Appellant of his, 
Respondent's, withdrawal from the deal prior to the 
closing. (Tr. 44-45). 
The question of intent is, of course, controlling 
in the interpretation of the rule of merger of documents, 
Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Smith~ 41 N.IVI. 82, (H 
P. 2d 377 ( 1936), and the intent here was clear both 
from Respondent's testimony and the external facts 
that the transaction be completed excluding Respond-
ent from both its benefit and obligation. 
IV 
EVEN SHOULD THE DEBT-ASSUMP-
TION PROVISIONS OF THE EARNEST 
MONEY AGREEMENT BE APPLICABLE 
TO RESPONDENT, TJIERE WAS A TOTAL 
FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION AS TO RE-
SPONDENT, IN THAT APPELLANT DID 
NOT PERFORM HIS OBLIGATIONS TO RE-
SPONDENT. 
The Earnest Money Agreement called simply for 
an exchange of property with the buyers therein agree-
ing to assume payment for certain "extras" as an addi-
tional consideration for Appellant's conveyance to 
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them of the Kelsey property. Appellant did not and 
has not conveyed that property to Respondent. Re-
spondent has, therefore, not received that to which the 
Agreement entitled him. Unless and until Appellant 
performs his part of the bargain, there is a complete 
failure of consideration as to Respondent. It is ax10-
matic that tq be enforceable a contract must be sup-
ported by a good and valuable consideration such as 
was bargained for by the parties. Forgeron Incorpo-
rated v. Hansen, 149 Cal. App. 2d, 362, 308 P. 2d 406 
(1957). 
Appellant argues Respondent received "some 
benefit" from the exchange when he relinquished his 
interest in the Kelsey property under a separate ar-
rangement with :Mr. Hansen and implies Respondent 
would, therefore, be unjustly enriched if not forced to 
perform under the Earnest lVloney Agreement. What-
ever benefit, if any, Respondent received in his separate 
dealing with Mr. Hansen was received in exchange 
for relinquishing his right and interest to the Kelsey 
property and, hence, there was a quid pro quo and he 
cannot be said to have gained any form of improper 
benefit. 
But beyond this, whatever the negotiations between 
l\ir. IIansen and Respondent, they were of no concern 
to Appellant nor to this proceeding. Respondent, for 
a reason he deemed adequate and with the knowledge 
of Appellant, relir~quished his interest in the Kelsey 
property to Mr. If ansen. Appellant then performed 
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his part of the original bargain but only as far as Mr. 
Hansen is concerned. That performance and the re-
ciprocal performance of Mr. Hansen excluded Re-
spondent entirely from any consideration under the 
Agreement and precludes any attempt to now force 
him to perform thereunder. 
CONCLUSION 
The Lower Court, after hearing all the evider:.ce 
in this matter, properly held that Respondent was not 
obligated under the Earnest J\1oney Agreement and 
the dismissal of Appellant's Complaint as to Respond-
ent should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIRTON & BETTILYON 
By W. W. Kirton, Jr. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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